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Foreword 
How did Great Britain manage to sustain its financial supremacy in the 
international economy that expanded so rapidly in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, while also maintaining its commitment to keeping 
the pound sterling fully convertible into a fixed amount of gold? Somehow 
it managed this despite the gold reserves of the Bank of England lagging 
increasingly behind those of its competitors for trade and empire: France, 
Germany, and the United States. Various answers to this nagging ques-
tion have been proposed by analysts over the years, starting with Walter 
Bagehot's classic work, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market 
(1873). Financial historians continue to devise more answers based on inten-
sive analysis of the financial data that were generated by the financial press 
and by delving into the financial archives of leading banks and investment 
houses. Most of them propose some form of ongoing financial innovations, 
whether gold devices, central bank cooperation, or de facto gold exchange 
standards to explain how Britain managed this remarkable run of financial 
fortune. (Mea culpa as well!) 
Wadan Narsey proposes an alternative, based on his research into the 
recondite archives of the Public Records Office, Kew (London). Simply put, 
Britain husbanded its gold reserves by keeping its subordinate colonies 
on silver standards, circulating token coins containing less-than-market 
value of precious metal. This policy began with the Glorious Revolution of 
1688-89 and the Great Recoinage that followed in 1696; it continued there-
after right up to the height of the British Empire with the African colonies in 
1884. The breakaway of the American colonies and their later success with 
full-bodied silver and gold coins, however, forced the British government to 
allow similar coinages in the self-governing, white-settled colonies, while 
keeping Asian and African colonies on token currencies, backed unneces-
sarily by excessive holdings of British government securities. 
The trauma of the Baring Crisis of 1890 put the Bank of England and 
Treasury into crisis management mode, moreover, leading to the general 
imposition of currency boards in all the dependent British colonies, 
currency boards that continued to prove their usefulness for financing 
the home country through two World Wars and the Great Depression. By 
keeping 110% backing for the colonial currencies in the form of short-term 
British government securities and liquid deposits with the Bank of England, 
the currency boards in the dependent colonies helped sustain home govern-
ment finances but stifled the colonial economies. The later successes of 
currency boards in Hong Kong and Singapore after de-colonization are due 
xi 
xii Foreword 
to their freedom from imperial control, not the inherent virtues of fully 
backed currencies. 
Political forces are always present in the fields of money and finance, 
and Professor Narsey's research shows how imperial priorities took prece-
dence over native desires for economic development throughout the history 
of British colonial currency systems. This was an undesirable, but fully 
intended, consequence of imperial financial innovations in the British 
colonies. 
Professor Larry Neal 
Professor Emeritus of Economics 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign · 
Pref ace 
This book is based on a DPhil I began in 1981 at the Institute of Development 
Studies (Sussex University) on Fiji's colonial and post-colonial monetary and 
banking system. However, initial historical research at the Public Records 
Office (Kew) turned up enough anomalies in existing accounts to warrant 
a 'leap in the dark' to a topic covering the entire British colonial empire. 
Returning to Fiji in 1984, it took another four years to complete the thesis, 
battling political distractions such as military coups. I thank The University 
of the South Pacific for giving me study leave, and I thank Charles Harvey 
and David Evans, my supervisors at IDS. 
I regret that I wasted Palgrave Macmillan's 1990 offer to publish the book 
because of my preoccupation with local development issues. It is a minor 
miracle that 25 years later this study has not been superseded by other 
works, while some have enhanced my book. 
This last revision was begun while I was an adjunct professor at The 
Cairns Institute (James Cook University, Australia), an appointment assisted 
by Professor Hurriyet Babacan (then director of TCI) and Professor Robbie 
Robertson (Head of Social Science at JCU). Based in Fiji, I am grateful to the 
online services of the JCU Library. 
Professor Salim Rashid was kind enough to put me in touch with Professor 
Larry Neal (Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Illinois) who I 
cannot thank enough for his valuable advice on restructuring the book and 
on recent new sources, for writing the Foreword, and generally facilitating 
this publication with Palgrave Macmillan. I am grateful for the efficient 
facilitation of the editorial and production activities by Vidhya Jayaprakash 
(Newgen Knowledge Works Pvt Ltd), and the excellent copy editing by John 
Bowdler (Bowdler's Editorial). 
During the course of my research I appreciated British academics (such as 
J. Mars, Arthur Hazlewood and Thomas Balogh) who wrote bravely about 
Britain's exploitation of colonies. I appreciate today the many honest British 
imperial civil servants who opposed their superiors, when imperial decisions 
were not in the interests of the colonized peoples, and left a 'paper trail' so 
useful to me in clarifying the true nature of imperial decision-making. It is 
a lesson for civil servants in today's Third World, including Fiji. 
I remember that 25 years ago, my wife Sin Joan Yee and three sons 
(Siddhartha Weih-jen, Sugata Weih-men and Amitaabh Weih-len) took on 
more than their fair share of the burdens of a young family, while I was 
struggling in Fiji, to complete the original thesis. I will always owe a debt 
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to my parents, Maniben and Narsey Bhai Dullabh, who sacrificed much for 
their children's education. 
I remember my good Fijian friend, the late Nand Kisor Chetty, who 
used to vainly pester me to publish my book. I thank Kurt Schuler (Senior 
Fellow at the NY Centre for Financial Stability and a currency board 
scholar) for his recent encouragement to publish my thesis which he read 
twenty years ago. 
I dedicate this book to five individuals. The first two are Poet Laureates 
John Masefield ("A University, Splendid, Beautiful and Enduring") and Nobel 
Laureate Rabindranath Tagore ("Where the Mind Is without Fear"). Their 
words guided 1ne for decades while teaching at The University of the South 
Pacific. The third was much more than a mere economist: B. R. Ambedkar 
was one of the authors of the Indian constitution and more importantly 
became a heroic leader of the 'untouchables' in India, where universities are 
named after him. The fourth is Aung Sang Suu Kyi, Burmese freedom fighter 
who after decades of struggling has finally achieved a democratic victory in 
the 2015 elections and will hopefully form government in early 2016 ("one 
has no right to hope without endeavor"). The fifth dedication is to my wife, 
Sin Joan Yee, who for decades has stoically put up with all the social fall-out 
resulting from my free economic, political and social commentaries, not 
easy in a small society like Fiji where she also has led her own independent 
professional and public life. 
Wadan Narsey 
Adjunct Professor, The Cairns Institute, 
James Cook University, Australia 
Adjunct Professor, Swinburne University, Australia 
Former Professor of Economics, University of the South Pacific 
Suva, Fiji 
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1 
Introduction: The Accepted History 
of British Colonial Currency Systems 
and the Key Questions 
Introduction 
It might be surprising that anything substantially new can be written about 
the monetary and financial impact of British imperialism. Yet the standard 
authoritative works on the British Empire, such as Lawrence James' (1994) 
(The rise and fall of the British Empire), Niall Ferguson's (2002) (Empire: the rise 
and demise of the British world order and the lessons for global power), Robert 
Johnson's (2003) (British Imperialism) and Philippa Levine's (2007) (The 
British Empire: sunrise to sunset) do not have a single reference to currency 
or money in their indexes. The one exception is British Empire, edited by 
P. J. Marshall (1996) which not only has six references to 'currencies' in its 
index, but a chapter by D.K. Fieldhouse (1996:111) has a box titled 'Money-
an imperial tool?' This book is effectively an expansion of that one question, 
tracing the historical evolution of colonial currency systems throughout the 
British Empire, over a period of some 300 years to the end of the 1950s. 
This book is not an attempt to answer grand questions such as 'was British 
imperialism positive or negative for the colonized countries and people', as 
was the objective of Davis and Huttenback (1986) and as discussed further 
by Niall Ferguson (2002, 2003). Rather, it presents a long-term historical 
account of imperial policies on the most fundamental and essential instru-
ments of capitalist market processes in colonies - currency and money, and 
associated institutions such as banks and central banks - whose long-term 
impact on capitalist growth and development may be theorized even if 
virtually impossible to quantify and summarize in cliometric studies. 
In the process much material is presented, which will no doubt be used in 
the imperialism debate by those more qualified and interested. In exploring 
the internal imperial debates over changes in colonial currency policies, the 
book also gives many pointers on the likely developmental impacts on the 
colonial economies and people, as well as clarifying the roles of imperial 
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interests, British Government (Colonial Office and British Treasury), the 
Bank of England and the City beyond. 
A new chapter, on the contrasts with the imperial relationships and expe-
riences of the white settler dominions (Chapter 9) widens the scope of the 
normal economic debate to include possible alternative paths for colonial 
development and the limitations created by the role of racism in imperial 
policy, as explored by Olivier Accominotti et al (2009).1 
The London institutions influencing colonial currency policies 
Ordinary readers need to be aware of the legal positions of the several institu-
tions that feature prominently in this book in relation to colonial currency 
changes. There is little doubt about the theoretical responsibility of colonial 
governments and the Secretary of State for Colonies in London, for colonial 
welfare. However, grey areas emerged when it came to the Crown Agents 
who were supposed to act in the interests of the colonial governments, but 
were supervised by the Secretary of State. To what extent did the Secretary 
of State for Colonies (and the Secretary of State for India) at critical times 
become subordinate to the British Treasury on colonial matters? To what 
extent did the Treasury at critical times become subordinate to the Bank of 
England? 
The Bank of England was in this period a profoundly strange beast, 
supposedly private, but also fulfilling a public role as the accepted regulator 
of the London money market and critical in the issue of British govern-
ment debt. Its shareholders and directors faced the perpetual tension that 
its profits were considerably lower the higher were the reserves it kept for the 
system at large. By contrast, other private financial institutions in London 
enjoyed considerably greater profits without the public responsibility that 
the Bank had for holding reserves that maintained sterling as world currency 
and the City as the center of world finance. 2 
At the turn of the century when the currency boards were being created, 
the Bank of England was by far the most powerful bank in Europe and the 
world, and the financier of the British Government for centuries, in war 
and peace. For the Bank of England the value of colonial sterling reserves 
cannot be underestimated, and by extension also for the other British banks 
who would otherwise have had to increase their reserves with the Bank of 
England to keep their systems going. 
The role of the City in financing world trade and the holder of the world's 
savings also depended on the confidence that the world had in the Bank of 
England ensuring the convertibility of sterling. 
The British Government also had its own tensions with the Bank, 
which was its main lending institution, but also complemented the British 
Government's international political strength which was dependent in turn 
on that of the City in world finance. Bagehot (1873) notes the extraordinary 
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silence of Parliament and the public on the role of the Bank of England 
and its powerful directors. The Bank also had its tensions with the other 
commercial banks, who expected the Bank to be a lender of last resort, 
sometimes when the Bank would rather let an irresponsible bank collapse. 
The key changes 
The history of currency and money in British colonies is as complex as their 
political histories. Some colonies had been wrested from other imperial 
powers who had already circulated their own national and international 
currencies; some, even after British colonization, continued to have strong 
economic links with non-British territories and their currency systems 
through 'currency areas'; and there were some colonies where the author-
ities chose to make use of existing non-British units of account while chan-
ging the inherent nature of the currencies. 
While Britain had adopted the gold standard for itself well before the 1816 
formal legislation, one major conundrum was that throughout the nine-
teenth century and well into the twentieth century, colonial requests for 
gold standards similar to Britain's own were rejected by imperial author-
ities and where they already existed, were eliminated. While most British 
colonies had ended the eighteenth century with non-British currencies 
(such as Spanish dollars and doubloons, Indian gold pagodas or rupees), 
these were replaced over the first half of the nineteenth century by silver 
tokens minted under British authority: British Indian rupees, British dollars, 
or most commonly, British sterling silver tokens. 
The established histories identify two nineteenth century colonial 
currency policies preceding the currency board stage. First, there was an 1825 
change of policy completed between 1838 and 1844, supposedly designed 
to ensure that the British shilling circulated 'wherever the British drum was 
heard' (Hopkins, 1970, p.104). Second, there was a 1838 replacement of this 
supposed 'monetary jingoism' by a 'more neutral policy' which acknowl-
edged the existence of 'currency areas'. Hopkins argued that this change 
was 'fully in accord with the mid-Victorian view of peaceful penetration; if 
sterling replaced other currencies, as in some parts of the world it did, well 
and good, but no direct pressure was exerted to ensure that this happened'. 
According to this view, in some parts of the colonial empire, the authorities 
supposedly found that it was impractical to circulate British sterling based 
on the gold standard. In India, Ceylon, Uganda and Mauritius, they found 
their solution to lie in the silver rupee. In others like Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Malaya, they minted silver dollars. One paradox to be explained is that 
Britain herself adopted a gold standard, while imposing silver standards and 
coins on her colonies, British and non-British. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the imperial authorities then 
also eliminated the British silver token currency, which had been freely 
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circulating within and across colonies and even into foreign territories. Most 
colonies were moved towards the 'currency board' system. The currency 
board was formally established in British West Africa in 1912, following 
the Emmott Committee of Inquiry. This West African Currency Board 
(WACB) was then presented as a model for 1nost other colonies throughout 
the British Empire. A similar system was formally established for the British 
East Caribbean colonies, even as late as 1950. Many monetary historians 
have described the colonial currencies as 'gold standard' or 'gold exchange 
standard' or 'sterling exchange standards', all descriptions challenged by 
this study as being inaccurate or outright wrong. 
The essential features of the currency board were the following: 
• the circulating coin had to be a distinct colonial silver token of unlimited 
legal tender; 
• colonial currency could be issued only in exchange for sterling or gold; 
• while ostensibly on gold exchange or sterling exchange standards, author-
ities insisted on a reserve of silver coins in the colony for the alleged 'local 
redemption' of colonial notes; 
• the colonial currency was backed by at least 110% sterling and gold 
reserves held largely in London, as note guarantee funds, coin guarantee 
funds, gold standard reserves and exchange funds; 
• for long periods of time, a minimum proportion of the reserves was 
required to be held in London as gold coins~ although banned from circu-
lating in colonies; 
• London reserves were invested in cash at the Bank of England, British 
Treasury Bills, or sterling securities, mostly of the British Government; 
• the colonies also accu1nulated Depreciation Funds to the value of 10% of 
the Note Guarantee Fund, supposedly to insure against depreciation of 
the securities; 
• colonial government revenues bore the ultimate liability for redeeming 
all colonial currency. 
There were clearly many solid advantages to the currency board system 
especially during periods of monetary instability. In the 1980s some 
monetary authorities, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, did experiment 
with re-establishing currency boards, but based on the US dollar, not ster-
ling as originally. During the 1990s, there was a resurgence of international 
interest led by Professor Steve Hanke, Co-Director of the Institute for Applied 
Economics, Global Health and Study of Business Enterprise, at the Johns 
Hopkins University. 3 As part of this exercise, some central European coun-
tries also experimented with currency boards as a solution to the monetary 
instability and allegedly superior to central banks. Although this study ends 
in the 1950s, Chapter 8 has a section commenting on this book's lessons for 
the debate on these recent experiences.4 
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There are two conundrums associated with the imperial creation of 
the currency board system. The first was that Britain, despite having 
complete political, administrative and economic control over colonies, 
did not establish its own sterling currency as the colonial currency right 
from the time she had formalized that system for Britain in 1816. On the 
contrary, Britain rigidly opposed its introduction in her colonies, despite 
all the obvious advantages: the usual text-book functions of money would 
have been adequately satisfied; the colonies would not have required any 
separate foreign reserves, exchange rate, or currency authorities; and there 
would have been many advantages to colonial trade, both regional and 
international, of having a unified Empire-wide market, as well as a sterling 
currency accepted by all neighboring territories and globally, given ster-
ling's role as world currency. 
With respect to the first conundrum, Fieldhouse (1981:61,63) argued that 
there were three obstacles to Britain's currency being used in her colonies: 
'First, European denominations were not necessarily suited to the needs 
of poor communities which needed coins representing very small values. 
Second, so long as coins had intrinsic metallic value and colonial paper 
money was not legal tender, it was necessary to transport large amounts 
of coin to settle balance of payments accounts. Third, many of the more 
advanced European possessions, particularly those in North Africa and Asia, 
had their own pre-colonial currencies which it would have been pointless 
and difficult to replace'. Fieldhouse concluded that for these and other 
(unstated) reasons, the British authorities opted for local but convertible 
colonial currencies, tied to that of the metropolis. These arguments are 
challenged by this study. 
The second conundrum was that if sterling was not to be used in colonies, 
why were the colonial currency systems not modeled on Britain's own ster-
ling system, as indeed frequently called for by British interests in colonies? 
While sterling had originally been a currency based on silver, the pound 
had de facto gone on to a gold standard from 1660. The British Mints were 
closed to silver from 1774 and in 1816, the British silver coins were made 
into tokens, with their legal tender limited to £2. From 1816 to 1914, a crit-
ical period for most of the colonial currency policies we discuss, the British 
pound was a gold standard currency, consisting of a circulation of Bank of 
England notes and gold sovereigns, with silver coins which were of limited 
legal tender. The Bank's notes had a fiduciary portion backed mostly by 
British Government securities, corresponding to the minimum normally 
required for local circulation, and referred to in currency board debates as 
the 'hard core'. Notes issued over this limit were required to be fully backed 
by gold. This fiduciary limit was set by the 1844 Bank Charter Act at around 
£14 millions and had only increased to about £20 millions by the twentieth 
century. However, after 1914, these limits were effectively circumvented by 
the issue of fiduciary Treasury notes whose circulation reached more than 
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£300 millions before 1918 and was allowed to grow along with the needs of 
the British economy. 
Had similar policies been followed for colonies before 1914, they would 
also have had a gold standard currency (whatever its name) consisting of 
notes and gold coins, comparable to Britain's own gold standard. The 'hard 
core' of notes required for purely local circulation, which in colonies the 
authorities estimated to be around 80% of the total circulation, could have 
been backed by colonial government securities, and the remainder by gold 
or sterling. There would have been some elasticity in the issuing of currency, 
according to the growing needs of the economy and colonial government 
expenditure. While gold and foreign reserves would undoubtedly have been 
necessary, they would have been much less than 100% of the total currency 
circulation, and probably less than 50%, as the currency experiences of most 
colonies indicated, especially given the balanced budget policies enforced 
on colonies by Britain. This study shows that such systems were indeed 
often proposed by colonies (both colonial governments and private inter-
ests) but were also invariably rejected by the imperial authorities. 
Studies of colonial currency systems have probably not tried to explain 
why they differed from Britain's partly because of a natural reluctance to 
compare economic conditions of 'underdeveloped' countries with those of 
'developed' countries. 5 However, if the policies were significantly different 
in the same period, then this does need explanation. If the differences were 
the result of the same principles applied to different colonial conditions, then 
any undesirable features might be explained as the result of an inadequate 
imperial understanding of currency principles or colonial conditions. On 
the other hand, if the differences resulted from conscious decisions to not 
apply the same principles despite their suitability, then there are likely impli-
cations for the debates on imperialism and colonial underdevelopment. 
Progressive evolution or monetary regression? 
There are two broadly opposed sets of explanations for changes in British 
colonial currency policies. The first and the largest body of literature of 
which Fieldhouse (1981) is a leading exponent, suggests a natural 'stages' 
sequence of progressive monetary development akin to W.W Rostow's model 
of stages of economic development beginning with a primitive society and 
ending with a mature developed modern economy. Firmly rooted within 
neoclassical economic theory, this literature explains the colonial monetary 
history as one of modernization of primitive and inferior currency systems, 
with every successive currency being better able to satisfy the basic func-
tions of money, leading to greater monetary integration of colonies with the 
metropolitan economy and world trade. 
For instance, Letiche (1974:186-87) saw the first stage having a diversity 
of local media of exchange, appealing to the taste and convenience of the 
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local population; the second stage saw consolidation into a single unit and 
monetary standard based on coins; the coins then were gradually replaced 
by private and government bank notes, convertible into local legal tender; 
with the establishment of the currency board in the fourth stage, the notes 
became convertible into sterling in London; in the fifth and last stage, the 
colonial territories achieved political independence and established their 
central banks and completely controlled their currencies. 
A second set of explanations sees colonial currency policies as manifesta-
tions of imperialist control of colonial economies, safeguarding the interests 
of the colonizing power rather than that of the colony. De Cecco (1974) and 
Nabudere (1981) are two good exponents of this view. Within this approach 
may also be situated much of the academic criticisms of the currency board 
system and the negative impacts on colonial welfare, that emerged during 
World War II and in the decade after. This debate is reexamined better in 
Chapter 8 following the historical evidence presented in this book. 
A recent study quite relevant for this book is Helleiner (2003:163-4) who 
used a rational theoretic approach to explore four sets of possible motiv-
ations in the making of national money: transactions costs, macro-eco-
nomic influence, seigniorage, and political identities. Helleiner argued that 
'the desire to minimize transactions costs was linked more to a desire to 
foster intra-empire economic transactions as well as the construction of 
an export-oriented economy designed to serve the colonizing country'; 
that while monetary reforms may have bolstered seigniorage profits for 
local authorities, they undermined the local economic elite; that while 
monetary reforms were intended to bolster political identities, these were 
not nationalistic ones, but rather identities being promoted by the ideolo-
gies of imperialism; and that while monetary reform created inter-colonial 
currency blocs, they reflected not the usual objectives of currency unions, 
but imperialist goals of simplifying administrative rule and fostering inter-
colonial commerce. Unfortunately, while Chapter 8 of Helleiner (2003) is 
titled, 'The monetary dimensions of imperialism: colonial currency reform' 
and the book is titled The Making of National Money: territorial currencies in 
historical perspective, there is no sustained historical analysis in the book to 
support his arguments. 
This study, by exploring the detailed internal imperial official correspond-
ence6 revealing the motives behind imperial decision-making on colonial 
currency policies, will provide a solid historical foundation for Helleiner's 
theoretical conclusion that while some elements of colonial currency 
systems were common, others were different because colonial monetary 
reforms were driven by the interests of the imperial power rather than by 
those of local policy makers. 7 
This book may be seen as a 'revisionist' history of the origins and evolu-
tion of colonial currency systems throughout the British Empire from the 
beginning to its end around the 1960s. The new historical perspectives have a 
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powerful bearing on most issues academically debated about the origins, the 
logic and the imperial management of the currency board system formalized 
in 1912. The historical evidence clarifies the actual thinking and motives of 
the imperial decision-makers, principally the Colonial Office, but strongly 
directed by the Treasury and Bank of England driven by their own object-
ives and priorities. Also documented are the deliberate imperial attempts to 
influence academia in defense of imperial currency and monetary policies for 
colonies. In the process, a rich and detailed historical perspective has been 
presented on the monetary aspects of the British Empire and possible impacts 
on colonial development and underdevelopment, thereby informing the 
broader economic, historical and political debates on British imperialism. 
The generalized misconceptions corrected8 
To rebut each and every 'modernizing' explanation of British colonial 
currency systems would be tedious and repetitive. It is more useful to 
present a set of 'Generalized Misconceptions' which, while not present in 
all modernizing accounts, reasonably reflect the aggregate set of rationaliza-
tions to be found in previous histories of British colonial currency systems 
as far apart as West Indies, the Falklands, Singapore and Fiji. 
As is usually the case, conclusions by some reliable historian who accepted 
imperial rationalization at face value are repeated by subsequent studies 
until it becomes dogma. Often the incorrect views appeared rational partly 
because they coincided with the general view that colonization was an 
economic process of 'progressive modernization' and partly, as this study 
shows, imperial authorities had eliminated the alternatives and restricted 
the choices for colonies. 
The misconceptions are grouped under the sub-headings below, which 
broadly correspond to the chronology of colonial currency development, 
and the chapters in the book. This book shows that all these Generalized 
Misconceptions are wrong. 
Pre-currency board changes 
Generalized A1isconception 1. In the nineteenth century, because of the colonies' 
lack of demand for higher valued gold, Britain eliminated all gold coins, British 
and foreign, and imposed silver currencies and silver standards based on silver 
reserves, preferred by colonies, and more suitable for poor countries, requiring coins 
of low value and denomination. 
The contrary reality may be more accurately described as 'silver imperi-
alism', by which Britain, in its own interest, itself adopted the gold standard 
or the gold exchange standard but in colonies eliminated gold circulations 
and standards where they existed, while simultaneously imposing depre-
ciating silver on her colonies, either as silver standards or limited sterling 
exchange standards during the currency board period. 
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Contrary to the popular view, the transition of Britain to the gold standard 
was not an accidental or automatic process but the result of deliberate deci-
sions by the imperial state, at least from 1717, on the relative valuations 
of gold and silver coins, to ensure that silver did not re-establish itself in 
Britain. It was well recognized that gold's advantage of savings in weight 
and volume per monetary unit was relatively unimportant in an age of 
paper currency and bank deposits. 
The imperial authorities consciously rejected a silver standard for Britain 
itself, arguing that silver had historically depreciated relative to gold and 
was more likely to do so in the future, especially if other metropolitan 
countries, following Britain's example, also demonetized it. They argued 
that silver was inherently inferior to gold as a standard of value, means of 
payment and store of value. Yet all these disadvantages applied equally to 
the colonies, which were forced by Britain into absorbing silver as currency 
and reserves. 
Contrary to official claims, gold coins, both foreign and British, did origin-
ally circulate in colonies as far apart as West Indies, India, the Straits, West 
and East Africa. They were also clearly preferred to silver currency, by both 
foreign and local interests in the colonies, as universally accepted 1neans 
of payment and excellent stores of value. These gold circulations were all 
eliminated by British policy. 
It will be shown from the Reports of the British Gold and Silver 
Commission, and also the views of experts such as Jevons9 (who also 
advised other metropolitan countries10), that an international bimetallic 
agreement was desirable and feasible. There was consensus that the funda-
mental objective of a stable and just international monetary standard was 
better satisfied by bimetallism rather than the narrower and appreciating 
gold standard which many thought favored creditors at debtors' expense, 
both at the level of nations, and individuals. Imperial expert Hawtrey 
(1927:83) had himself concluded that the defects of gold and silver as stand-
ards of value in the nineteenth century 'have been attributable to causes 
within human control'. 
The international monetary conferences revealed that Britain and the 
other metropolitan countries were all opposed to having a united monetary 
standard with their colonies, and it was primarily Britain's position which 
led to the metropolitan rejection of bimetallism at the international 
monetary conferences of the late nineteenth century, the metropolitan 
adoption of the gold standard and rejection of silver, and the subsequent 
long term depreciation in the gold values of silver. It was clear also that 
all other metropolitan countries recognized the disadvantages of absorbing 
silver while Britain remained on a gold standard. 
The metropolitan countries all recognized that whatever monetary solu-
tion was adopted for themselves, the colonies would not be allowed to have 
either gold or bimetallic standards, but must continue to absorb silver. 
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Even as late as the 1930s, Britain, while fully realizing the impossibility 
of the international remonetization of silver, continued to dump much of 
the world's production of depreciating silver into India, China and other 
colonies. Imperial concerns again were markets for British exports and the 
disadvantages for Britain of holding silver. Britain ensured that India did 
not sell her surplus silver on a large scale, but continued to absorb silver as 
currency or into private hoards, in order to help stabilize the price of silver 
and to reduce Indian demands for gold from the London money market.11 
The British authorities were very much aware of the continued losses faced 
by Indians, whose savings were in the form of silver ornaments or bullion, and 
whose rupee value kept falling.12 Even with surplus silver stocks in the hands 
of the Indian Government, Britain seemed to be implementing deals which 
meant that India absorbed more silver in the late 1930s, while giving up gold 
to Britain.13 During World War II, Britain seriously considered the produc-
tion and sale of silver (and to a limited extent, gold) trinkets in colonies at 
prices which would be many times their intrinsic values, with the objectives 
of fostering supplies of raw materials while absorbing with a massive profit, 
the resulting purchasing power in the hands of colonial natives.14 
De Cecco's view (1974:44) was that the silver-absorbing countries 'became 
the objects of international arbitrage to deprive them of gold' and followed 
Keynes' interpretation in seeing the debate on bimetallism and silver as 
a struggle between debtors and creditors, industrial entrepreneurs and 
importers of manufactured goods struggling against producers and exporters 
of primary commodities. De Cecco concluded (1974:58) that in all the 
metropolitan countries, 'industry prevail[ed] over agriculture, creditors over 
debtors ... faithfully mirrored by events in the various monetary systems'.15 
This 'silver imperialism' continued well into the twentieth century and 
deserves further research as to the precise City interests who gained from this 
silver export to the colonies, and their relation to imperial decision-making. 
Certainly, it would be easy to interpret it as a mechanism of imperialism, 
as defined by Griffin and Gurley, whereby Britain (and other metropolitan 
countries) directly and explicitly gained at the expense of the colonies and 
neo-colonies. This also indirectly undermines Schumpeter, who argued that 
under free trade there could not be any conflicts of interest between nations 
or classes.16 
Generalized i\1isconception 2. During the nineteenth centu~ Britain tried to imple-
ment a uniform sterling currency (based on the British gold sovereigns) throughout 
the British Empire, but failed because of colonial preferences for silver currencies, 
including British silver. 
While British sterling would have ideally satisfied all the ideal monetary 
functions in the colonies and this was universally recognized and desired 
in colonies, it was banned outright or eliminated indirectly by unfavorable 
currency valuations. 
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When British silver or British dollars were being imposed on colonies, the 
authorities gave guarantees that the British coins (whether dollars or shil-
lings) were really sterling by another name and would be fully convertible 
into sterling in London. Nevertheless, there was an imperial assumption 
that these silver coins would never return to Britain to be redeemed for gold 
or sterling proper, and to discourage that possibility, the British silver coins 
were made into 'tokens' with a significant seigniorage taken out so that the 
bullion value was always less than the face value. There was even an expect-
ation that should natives melt these silver coins into bullion, this would be 
a non-reversible process, to Britain's advantage. 
In contrast to Britain's adherence to Lord Liverpool's dictum that to 
ensure international acceptability, no seigniorage should interfere with the 
sovereign's function as a standard and measure of value, in colonies the 
imperial authorities deliberately weakened colonial currencies as standards 
of value by taking out a significant seigniorage, and circulating tokens only. 
This policy, as with Indian rupees and British dollars and shillings, ensured 
that they were discouraged as regional and international means of payment 
based on intrinsic silver content. 
The imperial authorities demonetized competing currencies, while also 
demonetizing the silver bullion savings of inhabitants by closing the mints 
to the public. All colonial currencies were separated from objective stand-
ards, with their values being maintained through artificial scarcity. 
When imperial authorities recognized that there was a possibility that 
regionally acceptable British silver might be returned physically to Britain, 
they established the Emmott Committee of Inquiry for West Africa to intro-
duce completely new localized silver coins, for which Britain could deny 
any liability and eliminate any possibility of a return to Britain. 
Generalized Misconception 3. Britain's fostering of other currencies, such as British 
silver rupees or dollars, was the result of the authorities' respect for the principle of 
1currency areas' and wish not to impose sterling where it was not desired. 
The imperial authorities persisted with foreign coins such as Spanish 
dollars in West Indies or even British rupee coins as in East Africa, not 
because of their respect for currency areas, but because of strong colonial 
preference for these coins as essential for their regional trade1 and the failure 
of imperial valuations intended to drive them out of circulation. Eventually1 
when the authorities were able to, they dispensed with the universally 
acceptable Spanish dollars, replacing them with British colonial dollars and 
British rupees, in turn replaced by East African rupees. There was no imperial 
respect for currency areas, with Britain far more interested in fostering colo-
nial trade with Britain, rather than with neighboring areas. 
The imposition of currency boards 
Generalized Misconception 4. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain 
could not allow colonies to continue using British silver because there was a danger 
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that colonies might 'over-issue' currency; there was a consequent danger of British 
tokens flooding back into Britain, where there was no institution with the legal 
liability for their redemption, therefore posing the danger of depreciation of British 
currency and inflation in Britain. 
These arguments are completely off the mark: the British Mint had total 
control over the issues of British silver tokens; British authorities had origin-
ally encouraged the colonial absorption of British silver by giving full 
guarantees of redemption into gold and sterling proper; and there was no 
likelihood of depreciation of British currency and inflation. 
The real imperial fear was that British silver, circulating throughout the 
world, posed a potential demand on London's gold reserves especially when 
the depreciated value of the inherent bullion meant a capital loss on any 
holder, including the British Mint. Imperial officials and British commer-
cial interests in colonies pointed out the hypocrisy of the imperial position, 
in that having obtained gold or sterling values for the British silver tokens, 
their refusal to redeem them was a fraud on the holders in the colonies. 
This fraud continued decades into the twentieth century. British silver in 
the colonies was ultimately melted down and converted into purely colonial 
coins, all at colonial expense. 
Generalized A1isconception 5. The West African Currency Board system, the proto-
type for others, was the result of the findings of the 1912 Emmott Committee of 
Inquiry into the currency needs of British West African colonies. The currency 
systems of the Straits and India were also based on the findings of their respective 
committees of inquiry. 
The historical reality was that the 'committees of inquiry' invariably 
ignored the views of witnesses, including the colonial economic inter-
ests (both British and local) as well as the views of the colonial officials. 
Some witnesses were 'primed' to give appropriate answers. The committees' 
'findings' and reco1nmendations were generally pre-determined, totally as 
required by Treasury and Bank of England interests, although there were 
some committee members who had opposing views. 
Generalized Misconception 6. While the currency board was to be a full gold 
standard or gold exchange system, its 'standard' coins had to be of silver because 
of the suitability ot and historical colonial preference for the lower value metal 
in the poorer, low per capita economies of British colonial Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean. 
There was no colonial preference for silver currency. The issue of suitable 
low value coins could just as well have been satisfied with copper coins. 
A second best preference was for British silver tokens, which were being 
accepted across the border; but even that was refused by imperial author-
ities, for fear of their return to Britain. 
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Generalized lvfisconception 7. The currency board system could not have a predom-
inantly paper currency system similar to Britain's, because the colonial peoples 
were not sophisticated enough to use a paper currency, their transactions needs 
were not large enough, and there was no significant colonial demand for paper 
currency. 
All the statements here are inaccurate. There was considerable demand 
for colonial paper currency, which was quite acceptable nationally. Indeed, 
colonial preference was for paper currency backed by gold reserves in the 
colonies, not the silver reserves that Britain imposed on them. 
The imperial authorities clearly accepted the note issues of private commer-
cial banks (usually owned by metropolitan interests), with extremely lenient 
reserve requirements, while opposing colonial government paper currency 
issues, which were ultirnately backed by colonial government revenues, 
hence safe from bankruptcy. 
In India, the imperial authorities deliberately limited the success of paper 
currency through measures such as defining limited circles of issue, ensuring 
that the Indian notes were not backed by gold reserves in India, and limiting 
government deposits with them while holding excessive government cash 
in London, thereby limiting private note issue in colonies. 
Behind the discouragement of paper currency was the fear that notes 
would totally replace silver, which would no longer be required in the 
colonies, and the colonies might want to insist on gold reserves in colonies. 
Both would have been against the interests of the City, which profited as 
suppliers of silver, and was also always in need of gold reserves in London to 
support their export of capital. 
Generalized 1\1isconception 8. A major imperial objective in creating the currency 
board system was to ensure that the seigniorage profits of currency issue, which 
were expected to be significant, became available for colonial expenditure. 
The seigniorage profit was merely a carrot as an incentive to colonies to 
change over from existing sterling silver to new localized colonial silver 
coins. Colonies were not expected to enjoy any significant value from the 
seigniorage, and for many, the profits were even lower as British silver and 
other foreign silver coins had to be melted down and reminted into new 
colonial silver coins, all at colonial expense. 
Far from being available for colonial expenditure, seigniorage from the 
colonial currency issue was to be maintained as gold and sterling securities 
in London, in order to guarantee convertibility for those who wanted ster-
ling in London. The authorities explicitly expected little to be available for 
colonial expenditure. 
The authorities even saw the success or failure of the proposed currency 
boards to depend on enough of the new colonial silver coins being melted 
down by the colonial natives (especially in Africa and Asia), thus forever redu-
cing the gold liability to their bullion content. A massive amount of rupees in 
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India were known to have been converted into ornaments which, from 1893, 
could not be directly ininted by their holders into new rupee coins. 
Generalized Misconception 9 Another major objective in creating the currency board 
system was to ensure complete confidence in and convertibility of the colonial 
currencYt which had to be backed by at least 110% of gold and sterling reserves - to 
be held in London, not the colonies. 
This was completely a non-argument, given that the colonial currencies 
originally being replaced were British sovereigns or silver tokens, which had 
already enjoyed colonial confidence. Even the British silver tokens had been 
originally given imperial guarantees of convertibility into sterling. 
The need to hold 110% of the face value of the notes and coins in 
colonies, was also totally unnecessary, as authorities had from the earliest 
times, acknowledged the principle of the 'hard core circulation' just as with 
the Bank of England fiduciary issue: that a certain minimum amount of 
currency and deposits would always be necessary for the normal functioning 
of the economy, would never be presented for redemption, and could quite 
comfortably be covered by colonial government securities. 
The authorities consistently refused to allow backing gold reserves to be 
held in colonies, because of the fear that they would be demanded for export 
to neighboring non-British territories, and therefore not be available to the 
London money market. 
Generalized Misconception 10. The 10% (sometimes 20%) margin over 100%, in 
addition to a Depreciation Fund (worth 10% of the Note Guarantee Fund), was 
necessary to safeguard the convertibility of colonial currencies, by allowing for 
capital losses (realized or unrealized) on the sterling securities held in the currency 
reserves. 
All the evidence suggests that this 10% Depreciation Fund was considered 
by all colonial authorities and interests, and Colonial Office officials to be 
totally unnecessary, given that the 110% cover was itself excessive. 
The Crown Agents had complained that the depreciation in the sterling 
securities held as part of the currency cover, was due entirely to imperial 
authorities' insistence on the funds holding short term British Government 
securities which were usually depreciated because the London money 
market disliked holding them. 
Currency board reserves policies 
Generalized Misconception 11. Responsibility for the management of colonial 
currency reserves lay through the colonial Currency Commissioners, the colo-
nial governments, the Crown Agents and Currency Boards - and ultimately the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. There was no overriding influence on the Crown 
Agents by any other imperial authority. 
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While these were the official legal lines of authority, the reality was 
that from the formation of the currency boards, the Secretary of State for 
Colonies listened to the Treasury, which usually went along with the wishes 
of the private Bank of England. The Crown Agents were often explicitly 
over-ridden when their advice went against that of the Treasury, the Bank of 
England and against British interests. 
The colonial governments' instructions to the Crown Agents were also 
disregarded when the Bank of England dictated otherwise, and colonies 
were often deliberately deceived or kept in the dark when sensitive imperial 
decisions were being made in Britain's interest and explicitly against colo-
nial welfare. 
Influential Colonial Office decision-makers usually sided with the 
Treasury and Bank of England in the full knowledge that colonial interests 
were being sacrificed in the interests of Her Majesty's Government and the 
City, and some may owe their imperial honors to this service. 
Critical academic studies were rejected and publicly argued against, some 
academics labelled as 'unpatriotic', despite the fact that the authorities 
had already internally acknowledged the validity of the criticisms. In the 
imperial interest, the colonial authorities in London went to the extent of 
anonymously and openly rebutting the academic criticisms, while fostering 
and manipulating alternative studies. 
Generalized Atf isconception 12. Britain insisted that colonial currency reserves hold 
minimum proportions of gold coin held in London, because the authorities wished 
to create gold standards or gold exchange standards in her colonies. 
The reality is that imperial authorities maintained non-interest earning 
gold reserves held with the Bank of England or invested specifically in 
British Government securities primarily to support sterling. The authorities 
opposed gold reserves and convertibility in the colonies for fear that the 
gold would leak out into neighboring territories. 
The currency board system was created with the primary objective of 
preventing free and ready convertibility for all holders of colonial currency 
within the colonies and the non-British surrounds. While British holders 
of colonial currency were guaranteed ready convertibility in London, 
such convertibility had little value for most local holders of the colonial 
currency, who were moreover discouraged by double conversion charges, as 
was recognized by the London authorities. The currency board money was 
intended to not have all the advantages that the pound and sovereign had 
as world money and universal equivalent. They were intended not to be 
ideal standards of value, generalized medium of exchange, regional means 
of payment, or efficient stores of value. Colonial currencies were not 1ster-
ling by other names', as even Colonial Office officials recognized internally 
in the 1950s. 
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Where paper currency was being issued, either by colonial governments 
of private banks, the imperial authorities ensured that the fiduciary portion 
was backed by British Government securities, or at worst, securities of 
private metropolitan banking interests, not colonial government securities 
or those of the dominions. 
Eventually, when sterling went into decline, far from colonial curren-
cies being regarded as completely convertible, colonies were paradoxically 
regarded as foreign countries whose currency reserves were a potential drain 
on Britain's balance of payments, even though they were net earners of 
dollar and gold surpluses used by Britain. 
Generalized Misconception 13. Reserves were invested in securities in London, in 
order to maximize the income from, and most rapidly accumulate the colonial 
currency reserves, with complete safety. 
The evidence is that, even when the system was being created there was no 
expectation of significant income. During long periods of time, especially 
after the 1930s, income was minimized in order to ease Britain's balance of 
payments. There was also no great safety in investing in London, especially 
when the securities depreciated heavily, when City holders discarded them 
for safer alternatives. 
The evidence indicates that senior Colonial Office functionaries acknowl-
edged that the colonial currency reserves policies being implemented were 
not in the best interests of the colonies but that of Britain. While colonies 
were forced to acquire and hold short-term British securities, the white 
settler dominions were diversifying from London sterling securities to NY 
dollar securities, once the decline of sterling became evident. 
It is clear that imperial manipulations of colonial currency reserves 
occurred in periods when sterling was going through crises of convertibility, 
when private holders of sterling, while investing abroad, eschewed the secur-
ities which colonial currency funds were required to hold. Thus colonial ster-
ling funds also helped finance British investment abroad. 
In the same periods, colonies were themselves restrained from taking 
loans in the London money market, while the private investors abroad and 
the white settler dominions were given priority. 
The colonies were therefore forced to maximize not only currency 
reserves in London, but also government cash balances, savings bank funds, 
commodity stabilization funds, and all others balances over which the 
imperial government had ultimate authority. 
The colonies were therefore forcibly paid a low return on their own funds 
in London, while a higher rate was paid by the1n on whatever little they 
were given permission to borrow. 
Generalized Misconception 14. 1'vfost of the securities held were those of the British 
Government on the grounds of liquidity and income, and not part of any deliberate 
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imperial policy of using colonial funds to finance British Government expenditure. 
Conversely, there was no deliberate policy of not holding colonial, dominion or 
other securities. 
The evidence is that the Currency Boards and the Crown Agents were 
pressured into discarding higher yielding sterling securities of the domin-
ions and the colonial governn1ent themselves, in order to purchase lower-
yielding British Government securities. Then, the Crown Agents and 
Currency Boards were pressured to inove fron1 longs to short term secur-
ities, Treasury Bills and even cash, in order to totally minimize the drain on 
sterling reserves. 
Despite the successful experience of some colonies in holding their own 
colonial government securities, these were gradually reduced and, ultim-
ately, the authorities refused to approve the currency boards or Crown 
Agents holding colonial government securities of their own or even those of 
other colonies, as part of their sterling reserves. 
The authorities created informal 'rules' whose creation, operation and 
official demise was deliberately kept hidden from the colonies. The author-
ities also used indirect agreements in the London money market as well as 
secret informal 1personal' communication with colonial officials in order to 
achieve their objectives. 
Some colonial administrators readily acquiesced to imperial wishes, expli-
citly serving Her Majesty's Government rather than that of the colonies 
under their responsibility. 
Generalized lviisconception 15. While the original intention of authorities had been 
to create a 'managed' system like the gold standard or the gold exchange standard, 
what naturally evolved by experience, practice and according to colonial needs, was 
a sterling exchange standard, with the diverse sounding colonial currencies really 
being pounds sterling by other names. 
There was never any intention of creating a true gold standard, or a 
true gold exchange standard. While it was from the beginning a sterling 
exchange standard, that was neither due to experience or colonial need; 
indeed, the latter would have preferred full sterling circulating in the 
colonies. The authorities opposed this more sensible option, as the ster-
ling paper currency (like the sterling silver tokens) would have leaked out 
into neighboring foreign territories and eventually called on London gold 
reserves. 
The frequent claims that colonial currency was really sterling by another 
name, were patently wrong.17 The colonial currencies were consciously 
designed to be different from sterling. 
Currency boards and colonial development and underdevelopment 
Generalized A1isconception 16. The introduction of British colonial currencies 
was a modernizing process substituting superior currencies for inferior currencies, 
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which were not as efficient in fulfilling the ideal functions of money, 18 nor did they 
have the desirable qualities possessed by modern money.19 
The historical evidence indicates that contrary to Letiche (1974) and 
Fieldhouse (1981) all the colonial currency changes were regressive by all 
the standards of an ideal money: as a suitable standard of value, medium of 
exchange, means of payment, and store of value. While there was no delib-
erate attempt to cause underdevelopment in the colonies, rather the imperial 
policy objective was to protect sterling, the capacity to invest internation-
ally, the desire to protect British government interests despite the acknowl-
edged disadvantages for colonies including colonial underdevelopment. 
Generalized A1isconception 17. The discretionary powers over the issue of currency 
could not be left safely in the hands of colonial governments; while there was no 
need to create colonial central banks which could foster monetary development, the 
British authorities did not discourage such institutions. 
There was no evidence that colonial governments, totally under the control 
of the Secretary of State for Colonies, were ever irresponsible. Yet all the 
evidence indicates vehement opposition to colonial central banks, even in 
large developed economies and the monetary markets such as in India. The 
Bank of England was usually the hidden hand behind such opposition. 
Generalized Misconception 18. The currency boards were not in any way intrin-
sically contributing factors to colonial underdevelopment. This is discussed at 
length in the concluding chapters. 
Generalized Misconception 19. British authorities were not behaving in any exploit-
ative 1imperialist' fashion with colonial currencies, but devising the most appro-
priate currency and monetary system for the colonial economies and people. 
This is discussed in the concluding chapters. 
Outline of chapters 
Chapter 2 outlines the two centuries of evolution of Britain's own currency 
between 1698 and 1893, its formal adoption of the gold standard in 1816, 
and rejection of bimetallism and silver for itself, despite European consensus 
on the need to maintain the bimetallic system. 
Chapter 3 presents Britain's imperial attempts at the replacement of 
the circulation of all gold and foreign currencies in colonies by silver, its 
initial attempt to circulate British silver tokens and British silver dollars, 
and the eventual decision to eliminate all British coins from the colonies. 
While this study focuses largely on colonies where major changes in colo-
nial currency policy were taking place and of greater interest to Britain-
namely West Indies, the Straits Settlements, India, and West and East 
Africa, there are references to other colonies where similar policy changes 
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were also occurring. Inevitably, the attempt to picture the whole 'forest' 
of British colonial currency policies must leave out important 'trees', some 
of which may be genuine anomalies requiring historically specific explan-
ation. However, the analysis of the entire forest is necessary to correct 
the misconceptions that still permeate many studies of colonial currency 
systems studied in isolation. 2° Chapter 3 also describes the major reserves 
crises in London during the period 1890 and 1914, and the explicit recog-
nition by Britain of the usefulness of the colonial reserves they were 
creating in London. 
Chapter 4 details the major currency changes that had to be enforced 
in India, the colonial territory vital to the sterling system, to ensure the 
minimization of demands for gold in London, and the strengthening of 
gold reserves in London. While some of the material for this chapter falls 
more logically within Chapter 3 (and vice versa), the territorial separation 
for chapters is used for narrating convenience. 
Similar policies are then traced in the Straits Settlements (Chapter 5), 
which links to the establishment of the currency board system in West 
Africa (Chapter 6), which most colonial historians have seen as a model for 
all colonies thereafter. The actual evidence by witnesses to the West Africa 
Barbour and West Africa Emmott Committees are shown to be opposite to 
the conclusions and recommendations of the final Report, which are shown 
to be fundamentally pre-determined imperial decisions serving imperial 
priorities, rather than the local colonial views and priorities. 
Chapter 7, covering a period four decades later, traces a series of internal 
conflicts between colonies and Colonial Office, and internal conflicts 
involving the Crown Agents, British Treasury and Bank of England, over 
the management policies for the colonial currency and cash reserves held in 
London. These events are shown to totally undermine the alleged logic in 
creating the currency boards decades earlier. The historical record points to 
the protection of sterling as being the central objective of imperial decision-
makers at all times, both in its rise and decline. 
Central to this protection was the use of colonial currency board policies 
to maximize colonial sterling balances invested in London (while minim-
izing their earnings), and the maximization of the holdings of short-term 
British Government securities, all under the effective control of the British 
Treasury and Bank of England. Chapter 7 also outlines the imperial response 
to academic criticisms of the currency board system, including anonymous 
publications by imperial civil servants, and the fostering of supposedly 
independent academic studies to counter the academic criticisms, assisted 
by political pressure on academic institutions. 
Chapter 8 is a reassessment of the previous academic debates on the 
economics of the currency boards, given the historical experience outlined 
in this book. While somewhat detailed, the discussions and debates may be 
useful for those wishing to examine similar implications with regard to the 
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US dollar or other currencies such as the renminbi and euro, as a reserve 
currency for other countries. There is then a brief section discussing the 
1990s advocacy of modern currency boards, argued by some to be a superior 
alternative to central banks. 
Chapter 9 outlines the currency and monetary experiences of the white 
settler colonies (referred to as 'dominions'), as a contrast and superior alter-
native to those of the colonies proper. With dominions being allowed great 
flexibility by imperial authorities explicitly because they were seen as white 
settler colonies, there is introduced the sociological factor of racism in this 
history of colonial currency. This chapter draws heavily on a recent publi-
cation (Accominotti et al 2009) which brings together many themes in the 
earlier chapters of this book. 
Chapter 10 then discusses the relevance of this book for theories of imperi-
alism and colonial underdevelopment. 
There is a section in the concluding chapter recommending a number 
of new research areas suggested by this book, apart from the old standard 
monetary questions: important colonies not fully investigated in this book; 
monetary imperialism in important areas of British informal control such 
as Egypt and the Middle East; the role of London non-government institu-
tions influential in colonial policy (such as the Bank of England, Crown 
Agents, other banks and bill brokers); institutional records not investigated 
in this study, especially those of the Crown Agents, British Treasury, and 
Bank of England;21 the role of local colonial collaborating interests; the role 
of academia in facilitating imperialism; imperial manipulation of official 
inquiries as a mechanism of formulating imperial policies; imperial policies 
on banking throughout the colonial empire and the dominions; monetary 
imperialisms by other super powers; lessons for future world currencies; 
:tvf arxist theories of money; and need for greater integration of econometrics 
with political economy. 
